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The Harmonization of Law and Mexican Antitrust:
Cooperation or Resistance?
JAMES E. CRAWFORD"
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Mexico have a relationship akin to that between
siblings-so close in many ways, but often so far apart on certain matters that
tension is certain to abound. From 1990 to 1992, negotiations were conducted
to find a solution to some of the economic tension between the two countries.
The result was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),' signed
by President George Bush on December 17, 1992.2 The Agreement set out to
change the economic relationship among the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. NAFTA created a uniform legal regime under which trade relations
will be conducted, "unifying one of the largest markets in the world" into an
area of essentially free trade.3 The benefits that were to come to the free trade
area were bought at a price; that is, the passage of NAFTA and its acceptance
by the American and Mexican people have been a very rough ride." In
addition to critiques about NAFTA's dealings with migration, labor, the
environment, and industrial development in the United States,- Mexico has
sustained an enormous amount of internal struggle within its political,
economic, and social structures.6 In fact, the past twenty to twenty-five years
* J.D., 1997, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.B.A., 1994, University of Notre
Dame. The author wishes to thank his parents, Jim and Sharon, and sister Colleen for their support
throughout law school, and Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr. and Ms. Shelly Gibson for their invaluable assistance
in the preparation of this note.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Irwin P. Altschuler & Claudia G. Pasche, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The
Ongoing Liberalization of Trade With Mexico, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 7,7 (1993).
3. Id
4. See Ruth Buchanan, Border Crossings: NAFTA, Regulatory Restructuring, and the Politics of
Place, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 371,376 (1995).
5. See id
6. Making the Most of NAFTA, 5 MEX. TRADE AND L. REP. 6, June 1, 1995, available in LEXIS,
BUSFIN Library, MTLR File.
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in Mexico can easily be described as "turbulent" with regard to all aspects of
Mexican life.7
The recent decades leading up to NAFTA reforms have been an economic
roller coaster ride for Mexico. In 1973, President Luis Echeverria was able to
get a new Foreign Investment Law' passed through the Mexican Congress. In
order to promote Mexican exports and raise national revenues, the 1973 Law
focused on developing a sense of economic independence in relation to its
trading partners. To this end, "[t]he key to balanced development under the
1973 Law was the granting of certain commercial activities only to the
Mexican state and to Mexican citizens and companies."9 The Mexican
Congress nationalized many industries to promote balanced development in
Mexico, but Article 13 of the Law caused uncertainty in foreign investors.
Under Article 13, foreign investment in any Mexican company could not
exceed forty-nine percent.'0 With this law in place, Mexico's economy
experienced a national "drying-up" of foreign investment dollars." The 1973
Law may have been an attempt to develop Mexico internally, but the Law
reached its breaking point in 1982 "when the Mexican economy took a sudden
and sustained fall due to failing petroleum prices. This resulted in a substantial
increase in Mexico's external debt, higher inflation, substantial capital flight,
and a 0.5% decline in the GNP in 1982 and 5.3% decline in 1983. ' 'I2
In 1988, Carlos Salinas de Gotari won the Mexican presidential election
and immediately set to work on an agenda designed to reverse the Mexican
economy's misfortune. In terms of the Mexican economy, the two most
significant aspects of Salinas' six year term as Mexican President were
7. See generally id. (tracking the legal, sociological, and economic changes in Mexico from the 1970s
to present).
8. Ley para Promover la lnversi6n Mexicana y Regular la lnversi6n Extranjera, D.O., 9 de marzo de
1973.
9. Lawrence E. Koslow, Mexican Foreign Investment Laws: An Overview, 18 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 441,445 (1992).
10. Id. at 446.
11. Foreign investment in Mexico dissipated as a result of the 1973 regulations because the rules were
perceived by foreign investors as uncertain in their application. The 49% rule restricted large investors
outright unless the government deemed the investment "critical" to developing certain fiscal policies, or if
the investor could convince the Foreign Investment Commission that some or all of seventeen criteria were
met under Article 13. The uncertainty and inconsistency in application turned away large amounts of
potential foreign investment in the 1970s. Id
12. Id. at 447.
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NAFTA and the 1989 foreign investment regulations 3 which tried to alleviate
some of the foreign capital problems created by the 1973 law.
The 1989 Regulations were thc first real push towards liberalization during
Salinas' tenure. As Dr. Lawrence E. Koslow points out:
The 1989 Regulations are an attempt to clarify the foreign
investment rules and to reduce the scope of government
discretion in the application of the 1973 Foreign Investment
Law. They also increase the availability of foreign
investment opportunities by opening up investments which,
until 1989, had not been available to foreign investors since
the early 1970s.'4
Although the foreign investment regime in Mexico was now, on paper,
substantially liberalized, investors outside of Mexico were still very cautious
about sending their capital into the country. This caution was due in part to the
historical instability of the Mexican economy, the lack of Mexican
infrastructure, uncertainty about the Salinas administration, and the fact that
some investment restrictions, such as the forty-nine percent limitation in the
1973 Law, were still in place. 5 It was obvious to both Salinas and the foreign
investment community that actions were needed beyond the 1989 regulations
in order to jump-start the economy. In 1990, NAFTA negotiations with
Canada and the United States began. The NAFTA provisions were
implemented in 1992,16 and other steps, like the abrogation of the forty-nine
percent foreign investment limit, were taken later.'"
Of the significant steps taken by the Salinas administration, NAFTA was
indeed the most daring and comprehensive attempt to open the Mexican
economy to foreign investors. By joining a free trade alliance with the United
States and Canada, Mexico's place as an emerging player in the global
marketplace took a new turn. The once highly protectionist trade regime of
old was dissipated by the reduction of import duties, the reduction of non-tariff
13. Regalamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la lnversi6n Extranjera,
D.O., 16 de mayo de 1989.
14. Koslow, supra note 9, at 453.
15. Id at 454.
16. Altschuler & Pasche, supra note 2, at 7.
17. Making the Most of NAFTA , supra note 6.
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barriers to trade, and market access provisions of the Agreement. Despite the
economic benefits that supposedly await Mexico after NAFTA comes to full
fruition, not all Mexicans have accepted the Agreement with open arms. Some
have referred to Salinas' actions as "the Americanization of Mexican Law,"'9
apparently a reference of criticism rather than flattery. This new shift to an
open trade regime represents a drastic change for the once highly protectionist
nation. Leading the Mexican economy into a realm of free trade is both
culturally and politically dangerous in a country with a history so engrossed
in government control of business. Indeed, it has been observed that Mexicans
have often relied on the government to have a controlling hand in their
economic welfare," and it may prove a dangerous transformation, as Mexican
political scientist Denise Dresser points out, "to change the way Mexicans
think of themselves by constructing a First World, North American identity."'"
NAFTA is a good study of what is referred to as "harmonization" of law.22
It is a creation of uniform rules and standards to which the Agreement parties
adhere in order to create a more fluid and open economic and legal regime.
Part of this harmonization process includes the area of antitrust law. Chapter
15 of NAFTA includes language on competition law under the new regime in
the hope that this harmonization will help further the goals of free trade set out
in the Agreement.23 In addition to NAFTA provisions regarding competition,
the Mexican Congress passed a new Economic Competition Law in 1992, the
Ley Federal Competencia Econ6mica, which established a new antitrust
regime for the country. In doing so, the Mexican government inserted a
stronger law into their system than the previously unenforced and impotent
18. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
19. See Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW &POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391,391 (1993).
20. Koslow, supra note 9, at 460.
21. Tod Robberson, For Mexico, a Revolution on the Line: NAFTA Awaited as Culmination of
Salinas's Sweeping Changes, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1993, at Al.
22. 1 say that NAFTA is a good study in harmonization because it sets up aframework in which the
countries can operate. In this respect, the regimes are at their basic points, harmonized. Some commentators
disagree and suggest that NAFTA is in fact a repudiation of harmonization because it sets up significantly
different regimes in which the countries operate. Jeffrey Atik is one scholar who says that NAFTA is not
a full realization of the harmonization process, especially in the area of environmental standards. For this
view, see Jeffrey Atik, Environmental Standards Within NAFTA: Difference by Design and the Retreat from
Harmonization, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81 (1996).
23. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1501, 32 I.L.M. at 663.
24. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, D.O., 24 de diciembre de 1992 [hereinafter Economic
Competition Law].
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Organic Law of Monopolies, enacted in 1934.2' This new law bears numerous
similarities to the antitrust regime enforced in the United States today and, as
such, is a very good example of the continuing attempts at harmonization
being made in the post-NAFTA environment in North America.
This paper will first discuss, in Part II, the process of harmonization as it
is generally regarded today. In Part III, the new Economic Competition Act
will be analyzed in light of some important aspects of the U.S. antitrust
regime. In Part IV, the paper will discuss whether this move by the Mexican
government is indeed a regular attempt at harmonization as we know it, or
whether the change in the law is a political compromise responding to the
liberalization of NAFTA. Part IV also discusses whether this is a
semiprotectionist law protecting the Mexican economy by closing out some
opportunities that otherwise would be available to the United States under a
truly unrestricted free trade regime. The conclusion arrived at is that this law
is a clear example of the latter position.
II. PRINCIPLES OF HARMONIZATION
A. Methods
1. Introduction
The phrase "harmonization of law" is essentially a term of art, subject to
different interpretations. In its most basic form, harmonization describes the
process by which differing sets of law come together to closely mirror one
another, thus creating similar legal atmospheres in which individuals,
corporations, and governments can act-and do so on an equal level.2 That is,
in eradicating differences between legal systems, the actors in both systems
can more easily operate and adapt their behavior in the "foreign" area without
worrying about the effects different laws may have on their actions. As New
York University law professor Eleanor Fox notes, "[p]eople begin to wish for
harmonization in order to tidy up a messy world; they wish everyone would
adopt the 'ideal' standard, which is the one they like the best."'27 Professor
25. Joshua A. Newberg, Mexico's New Economic Competition Law: Toward the Development of a
Mexican Law of Antitrust, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 587, 587(1994).
26. See George A. Zaphiriou, Unification and Harmonization of Law Relating to Global and Regional
Trading, 14N. ILL. U. L. REv. 407,416 (1994).
27. Eleanor M. Fox, Harmonization of Law and Procedures in a Globalized World: Why, What, and
19971
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Fox also notes, however, that a major problem with harmonization is found in
the debate over what is "ideal"; essentially, a situation may develop in which
what is good for the goose is not always acceptable to the gander.2" In addition
to the idea of harmonization referring to uniformity in a set of laws, another
view is that, in lieu of a universal set of rules, harmonization "directs a change
of rules, standards or processes in order to avoid conflicts and bring about
equivalence."29
2. International Agreements
In light of this brief introduction, it is important to analyze the mechanics
of harmonization, that is, how this situation of uniformity comes about in
practice. The first and most easily substantiated road to harmonization is by
way of international agreement. With a bilateral or multilateral treaty, two or
more States will contractually come to an understanding of how certain laws
are to be handled. This form of harmonization is often easily justified based
on the concept of sovereignty of nations. It is generally hoped that through
negotiating, deliberating, and ratifying international agreements, the States will
come to a keen understanding of what they have agreed upon. Then, in accord
with the concept of sovereignty, each State puts the newly-harmonized laws
into effect. NAFTA is an example of this type of contractual harmonization
among Mexico, Canada, and the United States.3" The three sovereign parties
entered into an agreement in which the laws were made to suit their needs. In
theory this harmonization will bind the parties accordingly.
3. Supranational Organizations
The second major way in which harmonization occurs is through mandate
or directive by a supranational organization. Either global or regional in
scope, supranational bodies set forth rules of behavior that member nations
will follow. These directives are often set forth as binding law among the
members of the body, but often the harmonization can occur by acceptance of
suggestions or model rules posited for acceptance. Some well-known
How?, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 593,593 (1991).
28. Id
29. Zaphiriou, supra note 26, at 407.
30. Seeid at418.
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examples of this method of harmonization are directives set forth by the EU
Commission, .the United Nations, the International Law Commission, and
sometimes by bodies like the American Bar Association or the World Health
Organization. Often, these rules are proposed by a body and are later
incorporated' into the legal regimes of the nations by a method of acceptance
via convention. One example is the Uniform Law on International Sales,
which was created by the United Nations Commission of International Trade
Law and later accepted by some major Member States by way of a convention
conference held at the Hague in 1964.3"
4. "Example"
A third possible method of harmonization is what could be termed
"example." This harmonization process happens when one country looks at
another's set of laws and changes its own regime based on what it feels is a
stronger or better administered regime. When one set of laws serves as an
illustration for another, the benefits and effects of harmonization are served. 2
Of course, this method is the hardest to observe in practice, as evidence can
only come about by one country admitting that it modeled its laws on the other
State's regime.
5. "Custom and Practice"
The fourth method, and the most important for the purposes here, is called
the "custom and practice" method. Laws may develop and transform in order
to adapt to political and economic reality. Law is not meant to be static.
Although some systems enjoy the continuity and stability created by long-
standing law, legal reality forces constant change. A good example of this
continuous change would occur in a country that is developing from an
agrarian-based economy into one that is industrial. When the country is
primarily agrarian, its laws may very well be harmonized with those of other
31. Id. at 409.
32. There is some anecdotal evidence of a number of Eastern European countries voluntarily
harmonizing their competition law with the laws of the European Community in the hope of achieving "trade
liberalization between them which approached that already obtained within the Community." Auke
Haagsma, International Competition Policy as a Means to Create an Open Global Market Place, in
INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OFCOMPETmON LAWS 409, 421 (Chia-Jui Cheng et al. eds., 1995). This
is a good illustration of "example" in action.
1997]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
agrarian countries. Mutual concern about agricultural policy, livestock, tariffs,
and trade would logically draw the regimes together. As the country begins
to develop its industrial base, its legal system will undergo a change that is
essential to the nation's continuing transformation. As industry grows, new
trading partners will enter the picture; new laws will be necessary to satisfy the
needs of the new relationships in areas like intellectual property, market access
for finished and raw goods, and the import and export of goods. The laws of
the State will often harmonize to parallel those of another nation in order to
facilitate these new relationships. The parallel harmonization primarily eases
trade and will hopefully spill over into other parts of the country's
socioeconomic structure.
"Custom and practice" harmonization is quite utilitarian in nature; the law
undergoes a harmonizing change because it better serves the situation at hand.
While the other harmonization methods can be described as also having
various degrees of utility, the utility here is the reason for the change, not
merely an effect of the change.
An additional note on the "custom and practice" method of harmonization
is that the harmonizing change may notjust evolve out of economic reality, but
also may result from changes in the political or social structures of a country.
For example, formerly socialist countries would harmonize their laws
according to changes spawned by both democratic political reform and
capitalist economic freedom. Such a significant change in the practice of a
country calls for a substantial transformation of the legal system. In addition,
custom may result in harmonization because of similarities in political and
social ideologies. For example, many former communist countries in Europe
based their laws on the collective and socialist leanings of communist doctrine.
In contrast, to better facilitate trade and international relations many Western
countries have acceded to a number of harmonizing conventions out of a sense
of custom and practice. 3
33. See generally Zaphiriou, supra note 26, at 410 (explaining that custom and practice is often a
motivating factor in the harmonization process, especially in the areas of commercial contracts, bills of
lading, and carriage of goods by sea).
[Vol. 4:407
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B. Reasons for Harmonization
1. Harmonization and Globalization
Now that the "nuts and bolts" of the harmonization process have been
presented, it is beneficial to discuss why this concept is so important in our
world today. What are the ramifications of harmonization in a global society?
The first aspect of harmonization's importance lies in the larger picture of
"globalization." Defining this term and exactly how harmonization fits within
it is a daunting task, as they are both terms of art. A few commentators have
given some good guidelines as to how globalization should be viewed. Dean
Alfred Aman points out that "'globalization' refers to complex, dynamic legal
and social processes." '34 Building on this concept of complexity and dynamics,
Professor Jost Delbrflck notes that globalization "may be defined as the
process of denationalization of markets, laws and politics in the sense of
interlacing peoples and individuals for the sake of the common good."" Using
these thoughts as guidelines to globalization, we can see how harmonizing law
would serve the dynamic processes that bring people together. As to Professor
Delbrfick's notion of the common good, whether harmonization serves this or
not depends on the facts of a given situation and whether harmonization has
served an end transcending national boundaries and national interests. Indeed,
as Professor Delbrilck points out, the entire concept of globalization may be
viewed as "a normative concept since it is related to a value judgment,"36 and
this idea will trickle down to many in judging the effects of harmonization.
Harmonization, then, can be seen as a way to a globalized society-one where
the common good is to be served and where nationalistic concerns are set aside
for a larger purpose.
2. Costs
A second reason for the harmonization of law is the continually important
area of costs." Simply put, harmonization can lower transaction costs between
34. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: An Introduction, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1993).
35. Jost Delbrflck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A
European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993).
36. Id
37. Fox, supra note 27, at 594.
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foreign parties. When international deals are made, utilization of a uniform set
of legal rules will lower the costs on both sides of the equation. First, there
will be no need for delay or extra money spent trying to negotiate,
compromise, and haggle over which laws are to apply, how disputes are to be
settled, and how jurisdictional questions will be handled. With one
harmonized regime, these concerns disappear. Additionally, there is an extra
cost that would be avoided, or at least lowered, if the transaction goes sour.
That is, in a harmonized regime, the likelihood of a transaction breaking down
and one of the parties defaulting is significantly lower. Hopefully, there is less
confusion over the terms and procedures put into multinational deals in a
harmonized regime, helping reduce the costs on the front end, and back end as
well.
3. Externalities
A third reason to advocate harmonization is the reduction of potential
externalities. Professor Fox explains that often "[flirms or countries may
engage in activities that impose costs on others for which the actor does not
have to pay."3 Harmonization of law reduces externalities by not allowing
any party in a given regime to commit a wrong and pass the cost onto another
party. If laws are harmonized, the wrongdoer pays for the harm because they
are subject to the same legal jurisdiction as the victim.39 When the law is not
harmonized, some regimes allow behavior that affects other regimes, but as
there is no law against the wrong in the first regime, the wrongdoer is
generally not going to internalize the cost. The cost is passed from the
wrongdoer out of the first regime and into the second. Harmonization can aid
in avoiding this problem.
4. Search for a "Better Way"
A fourth and final reason for harmonization is that there often is a "better
way" to do things. That is, no matter what the method, a country may look at
another country's laws as an illustration of how to better handle difficult
38. id
39. Of course, the problem of externalities does not only interact with harmonization on a "race to
the top" level. Harmonization can also occur in a "race to the bottom" where two regimes are harmonized
so that externalities are not eliminated at all. Wrongdoers do not suffer retribution for transnational
violations because neither country has effective regulations in place to remedy the wrong.
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situations in the law. Fox describes this dynamic as a relationship between a
"guidance-giver" and a "guidance seeker." ° The guidance-giver can often
give the seeker an example of the better, more efficient way to structure a
regime in a particular area of the law. Through harmonization, this can be
achieved, and the resulting integration allows the two States to relate with
much greater ease.
C. Reasons Against Harmonization
1. Power Disparities
In keeping with this idea of a harmonizing relationship between two
parties, it is appropriate to discuss some of the problems with the
harmonization of law. First, harmonization in its truest sense rarely occurs
outside of explicit agreements because in order to truly harmonize, there needs
to be acceptance and arms-length relations between the parties. Unfortunately,
the world is not always that simple, and significant disparities in power exist
between States. As Professor Fox states, "[s]tronger nations are likely to have
the power to steer harmonization towards their standards, whether or not their
standards are superior to or appropriate for weaker nations."', Unless one
believes in a theory of political and economic Darwinism4" among the States,
no one would really believe that this imbalance of power brings about genuine,
acceptable harmonization in its truest sense. It is an embodiment of the idea,
"if you want to play ball on my field, you must play by my rules or get out"-a
very hard offer for politically powerless countries to refuse.
The conflicts caused by power disparities is clearly evidenced in the
relationship between Mexico and the United States. This is the type of
problem mentioned earlier with regard to some of Salinas' critics, and what
Professor Martin Shapiro (among others) recognizes as an "Americanization
of commercial law."'43 This critique is based on the idea that, given the United
States' position as the strongest world power, harmonization with its partners,
40. Fox, supra note 27, at 595.
41. Id. at 596.
42. By "Economic Darwinism" I am referring to the idea that the strongest and most powerful
countries have the right to enforce their political and economic will on weaker countries merely because of
the power differential. This concept would apply in the present discussion if the United States forced its will
on Mexico and no one believed it a wrongful exertion of power due to a "might makes right" philosophy.
43. Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Lmv, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 39 (1993).
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especially in Central and South America, will be unfairly skewed in favor of
the United States. Indeed, even more support of this observation can be found
in Professor Delbriick's comment that the globalization process itself, of which
harmonization plays a large part, is a process "confined to the 'sunny side of
the globe."' Whether this disparity of power exists in any given
harmonization depends on the facts, but this aspect of the process is very real,
and this problem poses a major threat to the integrity of the harmonization
process.
2. Based on Normative Judgment of What is "Right"
A second problem with harmonization is that the process depends upon an
agreement between the parties on a subjective decision as to what is "right."
Parties trying to sort through the process of harmonization have to decide on
the best standard to apply in a given situation. If dissimilar parties attempt to
do this, agreeing on an answer to what is "right" will often be difficult.
Without this consensus, true harmonization evades the parties. This trouble
can be especially acute when politics and cultures clash, and particularly when
the economic needs of the parties do not coincide. When this barrier to
harmonization arises, the parties generally negotiate and work to a compromise
position where the parties can find middle ground. This raises another
problem in that it may not be beneficial to the parties (or to the common good
of a globalized community) to have harmonized regimes based on
compromise. The question arises as to whether the common good can truly be
served by parties reaching a compromised position-a position usually
achieved by both sides giving up part of what they wanted. A lowering of
standards, essentially, is achieved in favor of harmonization. Indeed, in very
large projects attempting harmonization, "the more surely harmonizing nations
will be obliged to compromise." '45
3. Ignores Social and Political Concerns
Thirdly, harmonization of law may ignore social and political concerns in
lieu of great economic benefits which may accrue in the process. This author
agrees with Professor Ruth Buchanan who argues that "the debate over the
44. DelbrUck, supra note 35, at 17.
45. Fox, supra note 27, at 596.
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NAFTA underemphasized its different local, sectoral, and regional impacts."
Professor Buchanan analyzes NAFTA in light of the maquiladora problem 47
and concerns regarding the borderlands of Mexico.43 Her focus is exactly on
the problem spoken about in this third criticism of harmonization.
In the harmonization process, benefits arising from certain changes in the
law can sometimes cause legislators to go about their business wearing
blinders. This inevitably leaves someone out of the loop. The problem is that
not everyone has a voice in the harmonization process. Before the common
good of globalization can be served by harmonization, this problem has to be
analyzed and evaluated. For better or worse, underemphasis of some social
and political concerns is a fact of the democratic political process and is very
difficult to remedy. But difficulty in finding a solution to the problem does not
eradicate the fact that people suffer in the meantime from what is lost in the
process.
4. Diversity = Efficiency?
Fourth, the harmonization of law can be critiqued on the concept of "out
of diversity arises efficiency." In effect, having diverse legal regimes forces
countries to always try to gain an advantage-there is a "race" to have the
"best" law. The diverse regimes engage in a process of legal development and
comparison, always trying to attain the "best" law, thus theoretically
optimizing the legislative differences. When laws are already harmonized, this
dynamic creativity is lost from the legal landscape. Although this argument
criticizes harmonization by saying the process stunts creative innovation in the
law, advocates of harmonization suggest that this "race" is not something to
be desired, because it is inevitably a "race to the bottom." '49 The "race to the
46. Buchanan, supra note 4, at 371.
47. The maquiladora problem which plagues the borderlands of northern Mexico centers on a large
group of industrial developments, almost entirely U.S.-owned, that are set up in poor border towns in
Mexico. The companies are attracted to the area because of incentives provided by the Mexican government
and the lower cost of operating facilities in Mexico. This development has led to numerous concerns
involving workers' rights, pollution, and poverty. For a good overview of maquiladora development and
the ongoing debate concerning the need for this type of industrialization, see ELLWYN R. STODDARD,
MAQUILA: ASSEMBLY PLANTS IN NORTHERN MEXICO (1987).
48. Buchanan, supra note 4, at 377.
49. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational
Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 992 (1995).
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bottom" suggests that the created legal regimes are lax and actually harm the
process of globalization by not accounting for the common good.
In addition to these concerns, the diversity issue may arise in trying to
decide what laws are best for a particular country. A country may harmonize
with another to reap the benefits of that harmonization, but the benefits need
to be measured by the harmonizing country's standards. Outside observers
may see the harmonization as good for the country, but it may be that the
country would be better off with a diverse regime. This is a criticism based on
cultural values and political goals that are not always considered in the
harmonization process. For whatever reason, the harmonizing country may
never see the disincentives to harmonization until too late in the game.
Ill. LEY FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONOMICA
Now that the methods, benefits, and criticisms of harmonization have been
covered, the attention shifts to the Economic Competition Law now in place
in Mexico. This law is an interesting study of the harmonization process.
Some of the harmonized aspects of the Law (in relation to U.S. antitrust) will
be briefly set forth in this section, then section IV will analyze the Law and
discuss how it may or may not fit the traditional bounds of harmonization.
A. Background
On November 16, 1992, Jaime Serra Puche, Mexico's Secretary of
Commerce, announced that some changes were going to be made in Mexico's
investment laws "which will bring Mexican laws in line with Canada and the
United States.' '4 ° One month later in December of 1992, the Mexican
government unveiled the new Federal Act Governing Economic Competition."
Generally seen as a consequence of the NAFTA talks,52 this new law replaced
the antiquated and toothless Organic Law of Monopolies, which had been on
the books but left unenforced since 1934."3 There are three main areas of the
50. Official Says Mexico to Change its Laws on Trade and Investment, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (BNA) No. 19, at 742 (Nov. 23, 1992), available in LEXIS, Banking Library,
BNABNK File.
51. Newberg, supra note 25, at 587.
52. Competition and Antitrust Laws, BUsINESS INTERNATIONAL FORECAsTING, Mar. 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, EIUCF File.
53. Newberg, supra note 25, at 587.
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Law which can be seen as strongly harmonized with antitrust law in the United
States: (1) focus on the competitive process, not the competitors; (2)
consideration of the different activities that are not allowed as restraints of
trade under both regimes (and the distinctions among them); and (3) the
enforcement mechanism adhered to under the Law.
B. Process v. Players
The first area of harmonized antitrust between the United States and
Mexico is the focus on the competitive process, as opposed to protecting the
individual competitors. When the Economic Competition Act was in the
proposal stages in Mexico, Commerce Secretary Serra Puche presented the
Law to the Mexican Chamber of Deputies as legislation focusing "on market
access, not company size."' This approach seems solid for a Mexico driven
to liberalize its economy and encourage an atmosphere of open competition
and trade. By focusing on the process and not the players, the regime will
hopefully garner respect and achieve a sense of uniformity in enforcement.
The first words of Chapter 1, Article 2 of the Economic Competition Law
express exactly this sentiment of protecting the competitive process."
The concept of setting up antitrust law to protect the competitive process
is also settled in the United States. In National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, Justice Stevens, discussing the "rule of reason"
rationale, said "it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on
competitive conditions."' One interesting distinction is that the harmonization
of law in this instance has come about by express language in the Mexican
Law that mirrors interpretations found in U.S. case law. This fact would
appear to give great weight to the argument that the Mexican Law has indeed
been strongly influenced by U.S. antitrust law. 7
54. Government Explains Rationale, Program for Anti-monopo, Legislation, 2 MEX. TRADE AND L.
REP. 12, Dec. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, MTLR File [hereinafter Government Explains
Rationale].
55. Economic Competition Law, supra note 24.
56. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). See also
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990) (stating that for a plaintiff to recover
in an antitrust action, the injury to the plaintiff must stem from a "competition-reducing aspect" of the
defendant's behavior).
57. Newberg, supra note 25, at 598.
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C. Restraints on Trade
The second area of antitrust harmonization is in the area of restraints on
trade. The relevant questions in this area are what restraints are considered
illegal and how are they distinguished within the law? In the United States,
antitrust jurisprudence makes a distinction between restraints on trade that are
per se illegal, and those acts which are illegal if found to violate the "rule of
reason."" With per se violations, in order to win the case, all plaintiffs must
show is that the act occurred, then the defendant will be held responsible. 9
Probably the best-known explanation of the per se rule is in Northern Pacific
Railway v. United States.' Justice Black stated, "[hlowever, there are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." 1 In the case of
a per se violation, the conduct is illegal regardless of the reason behind its
perpetration. Different types of behavior have been found to be per se illegal
over the years, including "price-fixing agreements, group boycotts, agreements
to divide markets, and tie-in sales." 2
In the history of antitrust law in the United States, Standard Oil, decided
in 1911, stands out as one of the most important judicial decisions. In
Standard Oil v. United States,63 the U.S. Supreme Court declared that Standard
Oil was an illegal monopoly under the Sherman Act of 1890 and that only
"'unreasonable' restraints of trade were forbidden."'6 This case gave rise to
what is known as the "rule of reason" in antitrust law. A much more lenient
and ambiguous standard than the per se rule, the "rule of reason" was clearly
described in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc." The Court stated
that "[u]nder [the 'rule of reason'], the factfinder weighs all of the
58. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 18 (1978).
59. Id.
60. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
61. Id at 5.
62. EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTrrRusT PRIMER 21 (1973).
63. Standard Oilv. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
64. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§I-7 (1958)).
65. KINTNER, supra note 62, at 12.
66. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. 7
The distinction between per se and "rule of reason" analysis in U.S.
antitrust jurisprudence has been harmonized into Mexico's new regime.
Chapter 2, Article 9 of the Law refers to pr6cticas monop6licas absolutas, or
absolute monopolistic practices." Some of the outlawed practices included in
this Article are the fixing, raising, or manipulating of prices 9 and the division
or allocation of market segments, either in potential or actual markets.7" These
illegal practices have a distinct U.S. antitrust flavor to them, a sign of
harmonization at work.
The idea of a less strict form of responsibility, as embodied in the "rule of
reason" in the United States, finds its way into the Mexican Law by way of
Chapter 2, Article 10. The activities in this section are prdcticas monop6licas
relativas, or relative monopolistic practices.7' Similar to the United States
standard, the relative monopolistic practice requires a more fact-sensitive
inquiry on the part of those passing judgment. As Joshua Newberg has stated,
A "relative" anticompetitive practice, therefore, will not be
found to violate the Mexican antitrust statute unless (1) the
purpose or effect of the restraint "could be, to unfairly drive
other economic agents from the market, substantially impede
their access to the market, or establish exclusive advantages
in favor of one or more persons," and (2) the practice is
undertaken by a person or group of persons having
"substantial power in the relevant market."'
This language that Newberg takes from Articles 10 and 11 of the Law suggests
an analysis quite similar to that expressed in the "rule of reason" rationale
explained in Continental T. V.3 The weighing of the factual circumstances and
the analysis of the market players' relative power resulting from the restraint
are harmonized characteristics of both the U.S. and Mexican systems.
67. Id at 49.
68. Economic Competition Law, supra note 24, at art. 9.
69. Id at art. 9, subart. I.
70. Id at art. 9, subart. IlI.
71. Id. at art. 10.
72. Newberg, supra note 25, at 592-93.
73. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
1997] 423
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
D. Enforcement Mechanisms
The final piece of harmonization which should be highlighted is the
enforcement mechanisms put in place by the Mexican Economic Competition
Act, and how these enforcements parallel governmental and private action
available in the United States. In the United States, antitrust law enforcement
can be roughly broken down to three levels: federal government enforcement,
state government enforcement, and private action. Federal enforcement and
private action will be discussed here. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are the two mainstays in federal antitrust
law enforcement in the United States.7' Though the system used to enforce the
antitrust provisions is complex and beyond the scope of this paper, it is
sufficient to note that the FTC is an independent agency of five presidential
appointees who work to enforce the Clayton Act (under which only civil
remedies are available), the Robinson-Patman Act, and indirectly, the Sherman
Act (where both civil and criminal remedies are available)." The DOJ, on the
other hand, has "exclusive federal jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act, and
co-jurisdiction with FTC to enforce the Clayton Act."76 What this means is
that, between the two organizations, there is a strong centralized system of
antitrust enforcement within the federal government. The power to
investigate, issue individual statements of policy enforcement, give general
guidelines, promulgate rules, and bring legal action against violators all lie
within the abilities of these two organizations.
In addition to federal government enforcement, a mechanism experiencing
increasing popularity is the private action. In short, if an individual has what
is referred to as "antitrust standing"' and proves that injury has been caused
by a violation of the antitrust law, the party may receive treble damages for the
injury.' These private actions generally enforce law found in the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act, and the ability to bring suit is found in Article 4 of the
Clayton Act.79
74. See KINTNER, supra note 62, at 24.
75. DAvtD S. COPELAND, BASIC ANTITRUST LAW 18 (1994).
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id at 24.
78. KINTNER, supra note 62, at 25.
79. Id
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In Mexico, the enforcement regime appears to be harmonized with that of
the United States; the Economic Competition Law provides for both a
centralized federal enforcement agency and the ability to bring private action.
Centralized federal enforcement in Mexico will now be handled by La
Comisi6n Federal De Competencia, the Federal Competition Commission
(FCC). Set up as an administrative body operating under the Secretary of
Trade and Industrial Promotion,"0 the FCC is given the task of investigating
and combating the spread of monopolies and monopolistic practices in
Mexico." Article 25 of the Law says that the FCC will consist of five
presidentially appointed comisionados to carry out the tasks given to the
Commission. 2 The similarity between the organizational structure of the FCC
and the FTC in the United States is striking, but the comparison does not end
there. The FCC has the power to investigate reported antitrust violations,
bring action, sanction offenders, and even offer non-binding advisory opinions
to parties who have queries regarding the legality of their own business
practices. 3 These similarities in government enforcement show a large
amount of harmonization with U.S. law, as does the provision allowing private
causes of action.
Article 38 of the Economic Competition Law authorizes private parties to
take action against antitrust violators." Similar to the multiple damage regime
of the United States, Article 38 allows private parties to recover double
damages (as opposed to treble). This amount is measured as twice the amount
levied against the defendant in the sanctioning action of the FCC, but it is
noted that the statute does not bind the Court into awarding double damages. 5
The significance of the private action in the new antitrust law is especially
acute from a historical viewpoint. As mentioned before, the Mexican people
have often seen their government take a strong hand in enforcing the laws, and
now this provision gives some power back to the Mexican people. In this
instance, the harmonization process has aided in empowering a vast group of
people who before had no ability and no effective law with which to fight
antitrust violators."
80. Economic Competition Law, supra note 24, at art. 23.
81. Id.
82. Id. at art. 25.
83. Rogelio L. Velarde, Antitrust in Mexico: A First, 23 INT'L Bus. LAW. 84, 84-86 (1995).
84. Economic Competition Law, supra note 24, at art. 38.
85. Newberg, supra note 25, at 597.
86. The FCC got off to a fast start after its inception. Velarde has noted that the FCC "has so far
shown a great deal of clout." Velarde, supra note 83, at 84. To this end, the comisionados have enforced
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IV. HARMONIZATION AND THE "COOPERATIVE ILLUSION"
The four main methods of harmonization have been laid out, and the
specific examples of harmonization in the Mexican antitrust law have been
analyzed. The questions that remain are whether this is a simple case of
harmonization in conjunction with the liberalizing regime now in effect in
Mexico or whether there is something else driving this evolution. Regardless
of the economic benefits that may fall upon both Mexico and the United States
because of the new Economic Competition Law, I believe that this example of
harmonization is not cooperative, pro-NAFTA legislation aimed at continuing
the liberalization of trade, but is an internally-driven, domestically-charged law
which is a possible reactionary measure to the opening up of Mexico.
The first step in analyzing the Law is to see how the language will play out
in Mexico's day-to-day business. This is an antitrust law. As such, it is in
place to increase competition, spread capital among companies and industries,
lower prices, and hopefully to avoid other monopolistic or semi-monopolistic
practices which hurt the Mexican economy. Of course, because of NAFTA
and other liberalizing and harmonizing measures taken by the Mexican
government in the early 1990s, it appears that the United States also stands to
gain a lot of ground in the Mexican economy. Whether in fact the benefit
accrues for the United States to the extent expected remains to be seen, but it
is not entirely clear that the new antitrust regime in Mexico will further the
United States' benefit.
If one looks back at the methods of harmonization, it is quite clear that the
new Economic Competition Law is not harmonization by international
agreement or supranational mandate, but it may be harmonization by
"example," or most likely, "custom and practice." The best candidate,
"custom and practice," fits in light of the changing economic and political
landscape of Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. Driven by the Salinas
administration's push for economic reform, Mexico sought the end of trouble
externally. Salinas thought the influx of foreign capital into the Mexican
economy would propel Mexico to prominent status in the world market. 7 The
problem with this policy is that it did not directly deal head-on with the
the new antitrust law in 86 separate cases in its first year. Id. at 85. In addition, there were 16 additional
investigations brought by the FCC sua sponte in the area of monop6licas absolulas. Id
87. See Koslow, supra note 9, at 447-48 (explaining how Salinas' boldest moves in the Mexican
economy were brought on, in large part, by a desire to make Mexico more attractive to outside investors).
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problems created by the internally-driven Investment Law of 1973. By
negotiating NAFTA"8 and lifting the forty-nine percent foreign investment
limitation in 1993," the Mexican economy made a severe about-face and the
Mexican government sought external help for essentially internal problems.
The Economic Competition Law is a tool to be used as a counterbalance to the
extreme turn experienced by the Mexican economy.
While the harmonization of the antitrust law may be praised by some
looking to invest in Mexico's new arena of free trade, a quick examination of
some initial commentary on the matter gives the Law a different gloss. In late
1992, when the new antitrust legislation was being debated in Mexico, many
businessmen expressed concern "because Mexican companies need protection
against U.S. and Canadian companies, even more so once NAFTA comes into
force." These are hardly attitudes normally associated with the idea of
cooperative legal harmonization. The domestic economic concerns facing
Mexico were not completely unheeded by the government. Commerce
Secretary Serra Puche remarked that the antitrust law was a step forward for
a Mexican government trying to generate "development that is more balanced
and growth in the Mexican economy that will permit the creation of more
employment and assure its better distribution throughout the country."'" The
eagerness to experience domestic growth and avoid domination by U.S.
businesses in a free trade area was also expressed by an attorney who noted
"that while current Mexican leadership genuinely does want to avoid
concentration of economic power among Mexican business interests, they also
want to ensure that they have the legal framework to deter formation of
excessive economic power by multinationals in a post-NAFTA
environment."
These last comments seem to fully grasp the centralized, domestic thrust
of the Economic Competition Law. In effect, the Law can be seen as a way for
Mexico to develop its domestic industry and infrastructure while limiting the
vast influx of economic power which would result from NAFTA. This is
based on the assumption that article 1501 of NAFTA is too simplistic and
without effective enforceability against the United States because part of the
power behind the Law is theirs-the Mexican Law is completely Mexico's to
88. Altschuler & Pasche, supra note 2, at 7.
89. Making the Most of NAFTA, supra note 6.
90. Government Explains Rationale, supra note 54.
91. Id
92. Id
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enforce as they see fit. To suggest that the Economic Competition Law is a
wholly protectionist measure would be incorrect, but the benefits to U.S. firms
derived from the Law appear to be of ancillary concern at best. While this is
not exactly what harmonization advocates hope to see, the passage of the
antitrust provisions should be viewed as a reaction to the overextended
liberalization of trade in Mexico. Even political leaders in opposition to
Salinas used the quick liberalization as a platform in the 1994 presidential
elections, saying that "the (Salinas) reforms were carried out too fast, in shock
form," and that the reforms caused the Mexican people to pay a very high
price. 93 The price paid is illustrated by the fact that the Mexican economy is
still not strong,' political uncertainties persist,9 and social problems exist at
every turn.' The Economic Competition Law will give the Mexican economy
time to develop on its own, while keeping the multinational juggernauts from
the North at bay.
While there is no doubt that Salinas' liberal economic reform has given a
boost to the Mexican economy, the majority of Mexicans still experience
problems that vary from banks not being able to transfer funds from other
Mexican banks, to the fact that "roughly 80 percent of Mexicans still lack
93. Christine Tierney, Mexico Candidates' Economic Plans Sound Similar, The Reuters Business
Report, July 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, REUBUS File.
94. Although many experts anticipate new growth in the Mexican economy for 1997, the country's
financial woes continue. In 1995, Mexico experienced its worst recession in 60 years, its GDP shrinking
by seven percent, and the already fragile banking system was further weakened. Leslie Crawford,
Turnaround a Welcome Surprise, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at 13. See also Mexican Economic Recovery
Depends on Revived Consumption: World Bank, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 23, 1996, available in
LEXIS, WORLD Library, AFP File (discussing the loss of 1.7 million Mexican jobs since 1994 and
continued problems due to weak domestic consumption). Some economic experts are so pessimistic about
the future of Mexico's economy that they fear an economic crisis as severe as that of December 1994 when
the peso was revalued by half. "Another economic crisis is likely before the end of [President] Zedillo's
term in 2000 .... perhaps as early as next year." Howard La Franchi, Why Mexico Keeps Hearing the
Refrain "Economic Crisis, " CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 1996, at 9.
95. See Geri Smith, Mexico: Day of the Dinosaurs, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 1996, at 52 (exploring the
distinct changes coming about in the Mexican government as President Emesto Zedillo struggles with issues
of disloyalty and corruption in the present administration. "Zedillo is becoming a lame duck four years
before his term ends. The result seems bound to be a politically less stable, less predictable Mexico, with
a more fractious PRI [the ruling party of Mexico] and a more assertive Congress .... ).
96. See Henry Tricks, Violent Protests Soar in Mexico, Study Shows, Reuters North American Wire,
Sept. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, REUNA File ("The outbreaks of violence in a
country racked last year by its worst economic crisis in half a century, ranged from overturning cars in
political disputes to lynchings, riots, public beatings and deadly assaults by armed guerrillas."). See also
Michael Stott, Rebels, Crime Hurt US. Investment in Mexico, Reuter Business Report, Sept. 29, 1996,
available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, REUBUS File ("Concern about kidnappings, guerrilla groups and
other crime has led U.S. investment in Mexico to slow down in the second half of this year .... ).
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basic phone service." '97 How these problems can be helped by foreign
investment dollars is unclear to many, including Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, an ex-
ally of Salinas who argues "that while Mexico's rich are getting richer,
unemployment, poverty and wage disparities are growing: 'I don't see where
there has been a single beneficial effect [of Salinas' reforms] without some
damage to the popular sectors."'' How does the Economic Competition Law
help to alleviate these problems? In addition to creating a leaner, more
efficient domestic economy for the Mexican people, the outside influences that
enter Mexico as a result of trade liberalization may dissipate, or at least not
grow to a point of power where there is no room for Mexican domestic
industry to grow and thrive.
That is, the new Economic Competition Law will develop the Mexican
economy from within by keeping domestic firms from engaging in
monopolistic practices, thus increasing competition and creating a more
efficient internal domestic market. In addition, the Economic Competition
Law will hold off domination by outside forces. Given the perilous state of the
Mexican economy in the past few years, the addition of trade liberalization
measures has left Mexico open and vulnerable to economic strength in the
North. Without the new antitrust law in place, U.S. transnational corporations
would be able to enter Mexico, establish a foothold in the marketplace, and
essentially run out all Mexican domestic competition, if they chose to do so.
These multinationals could accomplish this because of the size, resources,
management expertise, and political leverage that the corporations have. The
new Economic Competition Law takes aim at this type of external economic
power by not allowing U.S. companies to expand far enough to drive Mexican
businesses out of their home market. The antitrust law ensures a place in the
Mexican market for the domestic producer. Without the Law in place to stop
the progression, it is unclear at best as to how the Mexicans would be able to
stop the surge from the North.'
Another factor which may help explain the protectionist viewpoint of the
Mexican antitrust harmonization is the attitude of the Mexican people toward
97. Robberson, supra note 21, at Al.
98. Id
99. The dynamic I am trying to explain here has a domestic accord in the United States. There has
been a lot of media attention in the past five years on the movement of "hyperstores" like Wal-Mart into
small rural communities. When a store the size of Wal-Mart enters the community, smaller stores and
family-owned shops close down because they cannot compete with the prices, selection, and convenience
of the giant retailer. This is what I am trying to describe on a transnational level; Mexican businesses are
the small town shops, and U.S. multinationals are the Wal-Marts.
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the United States. Although it is dangerous to generalize about the perceptions
of the Mexican people, there is evidence that the protective interests served by
the Economic Competition Law are rooted in a desire for more than economic
protection. Professor Stephen Zamora documented some of the suspicions
held by the Mexican people in his essay, The Americanization of Mexican
Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement."°
Zamora notes that there is a "feeling among Mexicans that people in the
United States do not sufficiently value or appreciate Mexican culture or
society.'"' It may be suggested from this that protectionist attitudes toward
the United States may come from a fear of economic and cultural imperialism
resulting from an imbalanced partnership with the United States. Zamora goes
on to point out that author Sidney Weintraub calls the U.S.-Mexican
relationship a "'marriage of convenience'-an uneasy relationship in which
misunderstandings are common and neither party particularly values the
company of the other."'" Zamora adds a bleak footnote to this observation
by stating that "unfortunately, geopolitical realities preclude divorce."' 3
While the extent of these suspicions is unclear across the Mexican populace,
this is certainly strong evidence helping to explain the enactment of a
protective antitrust law so soon after sweeping liberal economic reforms were
put in place by the Salinas government. That is, public perceptions of the
United States and the oncoming effects of NAFTA called the Mexican people
to attention, and a response to their fears and concerns may very well be
embodied in the Economic Competition Law of Mexico.
An additional facet to the explanation behind the new antitrust legislation
in Mexico is the question of the role of the nation-state today. Namely, how
does the role of the nation-state play itself out in light of the Economic
Competition Law? Mexico has found itself in a precarious position over the
past decade. It is clear that the liberalizing changes in the Mexican economic
structure were the result of necessity; the country needed to liberalize and open
itself up in order to save its dying economy. With these changes in place, the
question arises as to how the nation-state should move to protect itself from
economic and cultural colonialism while continuing to open itself up to a
global marketplace. This balancing act has not been a traditional source of
100. Zamora, supra note 19.
101. Id. at 392.
102. Id at 393.
103. Id.
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concern for Mexico. In the past, the role of the State has been relatively clear
in regard to the United States. As Zamora points out, "[t]hroughout much of
its history, Mexico has tried to keep a safe distance from the United States in
order to mitigate any ill effects that U.S. political and economic hegemony
might produce."'" With a history of control in the economy, the new
liberalized regime called into question the role of the State in modem Mexico.
The new antitrust law is a good indication of the State's attempt to regain some
of the control it may have lost in the liberalization (or that was perceived lost
by the Mexican people). This move to stabilize, embodied in the new
Economic Competition Law, is a good example of the State's recognition that
Mexico is a country in flux-economically, politically, and socially. A
measure of this magnitude is an attempt to recapture the "balance" which is a
necessary component of a stable Mexican nation-state.
The key to this entire thesis coming to life is the FCC, the enforcement
arm of the new Economic Competition Law. It has been stated that, in
replacing the Organic Law of Monopolies of 1934, the new law superseded an
ineffectual piece of legislation in favor of one with some real power.0 5 In fact,
with regard to antitrust in Mexico, "[t]here are no treatises on the subject, no
case law and no records available of the actions" which may have been put in
front of the old federal agencies."° This Law gives the FCC the chance to
develop antitrust jurisprudence on their own terms, providing the opportunity
to guide the growing economy from within through open competition, while
keeping in check the economic power which can potentially harm Mexico
from the outside. This, of course, does not mean that the system will develop
on a discriminatory basis with the United States.' This new opportunity
provides a chance at real "control" over free trade as it operates in the newly
104. Id
105. Newberg, supra note 25, at 587.
106. Velarde, supra note 83, at 84.
107. Discrimination of this type is not only prohibited, but the Mexican government knows that it is
not in the country's best interest to discriminate against the United States in any way. It is not in Mexico's
best interest because of the importance the United States plays as an export market to Mexico. For example,
in 1993 the United States accounted for 87.51% of all non-oil exports to OECD countries. Banco de
Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1996 (visited Mar. 6, 1997) <http://www.banxico.org.mx/public-html/doyai
/mexecon96/m96iv6.html>. Even the latest figures from the U.S. Census Bureau point to the United States'
continuing importance to Mexico (and Mexico's importance to the United States). In 1996, the United
States had combined with Mexico to trade $130.02 billion total. This makes Mexico the third largest U.S.
trade partner behind Canada and Japan. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Top
Ten Countries with Which the US. Trades (last modified Mar. 3, 1997) <http://www.census.gov/foreign-
tradelwww/balance.htnl>.
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liberalized trade regime of Mexico. The shocking effects of moving to an
open market in Mexico will be tempered by effective enforcement of the
competition laws.
The crux of this argument lies in the admission that liberalizing free trade
in Mexico is good for the economic development of the country, but there
would be a significant danger of the external power spiraling out of control
into Mexico if not for the new antitrust regulations that are now in place.
While the competitive atmosphere of the economy begins to mature, the FCC
will have a guiding role. Without the FCC's ability to enforce the Economic
Competition Law, it would be conceivable that some industries in Mexico
could become wholly owned by foreign interests-not just whole companies,
but whole industries. What this would do to an already perilous Mexican
economy is quite scary to consider, given the country's past troubles with
inflation, currency devaluation, unemployment, and poverty. The Economic
Competition Law developed during a time of vast change in Mexico and a time
of large scale harmonization with the United States. The Law originated "at
a time when business ownership [was] in a state of flux, partly as a result of
the privatisation of many state enterprises and partly in response to new
trading opportunities."'0 8 For a country that, not ten years earlier, "was a
socialist state in all but name,"" the reforms and liberalization took on an
intimidating feel for a lot of Mexicans. The Economic Competition Law is a
harmonized response to that concern, bringing about a sense of stability and
a chance to improve and control the growth of the Mexican economy from
within. This was not merely an instance of harmonization borne out of
"custom or practice," but one borne out of necessity-a measure set up not to
enhance cooperation between Mexico and the United States, but to protect
Mexico's industry and people from a potentially destructive influx of
economic power from the United States. This measure may have stopped very
early on what could have developed into a case of economic colonialism, had
the United States been able to operate unfettered within the Mexican economy.
108. Economic Policy, Business International Country Report-Mexico, Apr. 12, 1993, available in
LEXIS, NSAMER Library, COURPT File.
109. Robberson, supra note 21, at Al.
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V. CONCLUSION
Of the lessons to be learned from Mexico's recent development of antitrust
law, the most important one is what it tells us about harmonization and its
relationship to a globalized system of law. One of the keys is not to take
anything for granted. Despite the benefits that accrue from certain aspects of
harmonization, not all of it is driven by a sense of comity and cooperation. In
order to strive for a truly global system of law and governance, harmonization
will occur, but it may be put into action in an unconventional manner. Here,
the Mexican antitrust legislation grew out of a movement of liberalization,
when in effect it serves as a much needed protection for the Mexican economy.
The "common good" originally thought to be served was for the benefit of free
trade, but the good served was the economic protection and development of the
Mexican people. How often this scenario plays itself out in practice in today's
ever-globalizing world is unclear, but it is clear that the harmonization process
in Mexican antitrust law was not completely based on cooperation with the
United States. In order to place harmonization in its proper perspective in a
world of increasing globalization, it will be necessary to look beyond both the
negotiation table and the language of the law in order to see the driving forces
and the impacted areas of newly harmonized law.
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